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| The Atonement; Human suffering | |
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| Topic Started: Wednesday, 27. September 2006, 18:23 (506 Views) | |
| PJD | Thursday, 17. May 2007, 19:10 Post #16 |
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Thanks for that reply jim1. PJD |
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| Rose of York | Friday, 12. September 2008, 19:29 Post #17 |
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Independent Catholic News has a good homily this weekend, on the matter of suffering.
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Keep the Faith! | |
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| PJD | Saturday, 13. September 2008, 20:13 Post #18 |
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For those who would like to include within their records a more technical-Aquinas-based exposition of this problem (evil of suffering), please read below:- Naturally the detail would be open for discussion; not everyone necessarily agrees with all of Aquinas' metaphysical thought etc. [PJD] “If God created all things, and if evil is a thing, we should have to say that God created evil directly. And rather than say this we might be inclined to follow the Manichaeans in ascribing the creation of evil to an evil deity, thus asserting a metaphysical dualism. But if evil is a privation [and not as a “thing”], it is not necessary to speak of it as having been created by God on the ground that God created all things. As a privation, evil can exist only “in” a being: it is ‘incidental’ or a ‘by-product’ [De potentia, 3,6, ad 3]. Aquinas does not mean that it is unimportant, but simply that there is no sense in talking about a privation which is not the privation of a perfection in a positive entity. The positive entity comes first, so to speak; before there can be any corruption or disorder there must be something to be corrupted or disordered. And according to Aquinas every being, considered as such, is good. If we consider a flea in relation to its unpleasant effects on us we can call it evil. But in itself, considered simply as a being, it is good. For every being is actual so far as it is being, and actuality involves perfection. And a perfection is ‘desirable’ either by the thing which possesses it or by something else. The flea has a tendency to its own self-preservation; and to this extent we can say that it ‘desires’ its own being. Being and good (when the word is used in this ontological sense) have the same denotation, though ‘good’ here signifies being considered in relation to will, desire, or natural inclination or tendency. If, therefore, every being is ‘good’, there is no need to postulate an evil deity as creator of evil; for evil is not and cannot be the direct term of creative activity. Nor, indeed, could there be an evil deity, if by this we mean a sheerly evil being. For sheer evil is an impossibility. Aquinas does not mean to deny the existence of Satan. But for him Satan is not an ultimate being at all, but a creature. Created good, he remains good, if considered simply as a being. He does not constitute an exception to the validity of a metaphysical analysis which allows of no exception. And if we once accept Aquinas’ use of terms, it is obvious that no being can be completely evil. For this follows from the use of the terms. But if metaphysical dualism of the type mentioned is excluded, it may appear that the problem of evil is rendered all the more acute. For is not the responsibility thrown back entirely on God? Even if God cannot be said to have directly created evil, He ‘foresaw’ it and, if He is omnipotent, He could prevent it. Must we not say, therefore, that God is ultimately responsible for evil? Let us take physical evil first. Aquinas certainly maintains that God did not will physical evils for their own sake; but he points out that God undoubtedly will the creation of a universe in which physical evil was in some way involved, as far as the natural order of events is concerned. [It is necessary to add this qualification, since Aquinas believed that under certain conditions (if there had been no Fall) the physical evils consequent on the Fall of man would not have occurred. But this theme belongs to dogmatic theology, not to philosophy. And in any case it is clear that God ‘foresaw’ what the world would in fact be like.]. For example,, to create sensitive beings means creating beings capable of feeling pain. Capacity for experiencing pleasure cannot naturally be separated from the capacity for experiencing pain. At the very least, therefore, God permitted the occurrence of physical evils. But Aquinas talks as though God willed certain evils for the sake of the perfection of the whole universe. For instance, he speaks as though the perfection of the whole universe requires the existence of mortal beings, subject to death, as well as of beings which cannot undergo bodily death, namely, the angels. This applies, however, only to those physical evils which, given the natural order, are inevitable, and not to those which owe their origin to human stupidity or to human wickedness. This picture of God as a kind of artist and of the universe as a work of art, requiring shadows as well as lights, is apt, in spite of its traditional character, to appear disconcerting and unhelpful to many minds. It certainly is not an anthropocentric view of the matter. As for moral evil, this was in no sense positively willed by God. It was, however, permitted by Him for the sake of a good, namely that man might be free, participating in his own limited degree in the divine freedom and capacity for creative activity. It may appear at first sight that if God can be said to will certain physical evils, like death, not for their own sake for the sake of the perfection of the universe, He should also be said to will moral evil that moral good might shine more brightly in contrast. But there is an obvious difference. There is nothing morally disreputable about bodily death. It is a natural phenomenon, which in the natural order of events is inevitably associated with animal and human existence. And when Aquinas says that God willed death for the sake of the perfection of the universe, though not for its own sake, he means that God willed the creation of animals and men for the sake of the perfection of the universe, animals and men being naturally mortal creatures. But moral evil is not an inevitable accompaniment of the development of human nature; nor is it necessary that the exercise of freedom should involve actual morally evil choices. Nor could God positively will that human beings should act immorally. But without supernatural intervention on God’s part man’s power to act morally involves in this life the power to choose immorally. And so God, in creating man, must be said to have permitted moral evil, though He did not will that man should choose to act immorally - although in fact He gives man the means of choosing rightly. The comment may be made that these considerations do not solve the problem of evil. The question is not whether God permitted evil, since it is obvious that He must have done so if He created the world, but rather how, if He is good, He could create a world which would involve the presence of so much evil. Quite apart from those physical evils which are inevitable in the natural course of events, moral evil and all those physical evils which are due to human stupidity and wickedness were foreseen and permitted by God. And the question is how He could permit this if He is both good and omnipotent. It may be said that nobody can suggest a detail picture of affairs in which evil would be absent. And this may be so. But it does not alter the fact that, according to Aquinas God freely chose to create a world in which He foresaw as present all those evils which are in fact present. To this question, why God chose this world, foreseeing all the evils which would in fact occur, no answer, I think, can be given. That is to say, no answer can be given which would be accepted by an objector as a ‘solution’ to the problem of evil. St. Bonaventure remarks that if anyone asks why God did not make a better world or make this world better, no answer can be given except that He so willed and that He Himself knows the reasons. And I do not see that Aquinas could say much more than this. Christian theological dogmas are doubtless relevant in some way to the problem of evil, but they do not constitute a theoretical solution of it. The doctrine of the redemption, for example, throws light on the way in which suffering can be made of value by the sufferer, but it does not solve the metaphysical ‘problem of evil’. It is important, however, to bear in mind the following points. First, it is not the case that Aquinas was blind to the problem of evil. Though he certainly adopts a less anthropocentric attitude toward suffering and death than many would be inclined to adopt, he remarks, for example, in the prologue to his commentary on the Book of Job that nothing is more difficult to reconcile with divine providence than the sufferings of the innocent. At the same time he was convinced that the metaphysician can prove the existence of God independently of the problem of evil, and that we therefore know that there is a solution to the problem even though we cannot provide it. And this, of course, is one of the ways in which he differs from the modern agnostic who is inclined to start with the problem in mind rather than to regard evil as something which has to be reconciled, so far as this is possible, with an already established truth. In conclusion it may be worth while pointing out that to say that God permitted evil for the sake of a greater good, which is to a great extent “veiled” from us, is not to say that human beings should do nothing towards diminishing the amount of evil in the world. We have to distinguish between the practical problem of alleviating suffering and diminishing its extent and the theoretical problem of evil which arises in a metaphysical or theological context. There is no reason for depicting Aquinas as suggesting that human beings should adopt a purely passive attitude towards evil. It is obvious that he held nothing of the kind with regard to moral evil. Nor did he make any such suggestion with regard to physical evil. He would say, of course, that though God foresaw and permitted evil, He also foresaw, and indeed willed, man’s efforts to diminish its extent.” |
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| Rose of York | Tuesday, 23. June 2009, 13:14 Post #19 |
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http://www.indcatholicnews.com/news.php?viewStory=14515
It all makes sense, I wonder what attitude I would take if I had an incurable disease that caused constant extreme suffering? |
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Keep the Faith! | |
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| Derekap | Tuesday, 23. June 2009, 16:23 Post #20 |
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me also! |
| Derekap | |
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9:16 AM Jul 11